Private Sector Development and Growth in Developing Countries: The Role of Tax Policy and Administration by Kundt, Thorben
   
Emerging Issues Report  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Dr. Thorben C. Kundt 
Independent Consultant 
September 2017 
 
Private Sector 
Development and Growth 
in Developing Countries: 
The Role of Tax Policy and 
Administration 
About this report 
The K4D Emerging Issues report series highlights research and emerging evidence to policy-makers to help 
inform policies that are more resilient to the future. K4D staff researchers work with thematic experts and DFID to 
identify where new or emerging research can inform and influence policy.   
This report is based on ten days of desk-based research.  
K4D services are provided by a consortium of leading organisations working in international development, led by 
the Institute of Development Studies (IDS), with Education Development Trust, Itad, University of Leeds Nuffield 
Centre for International Health and Development, Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine (LSTM), University of 
Birmingham International Development Department (IDD) and the University of Manchester Humanitarian and 
Conflict Response Institute (HCRI). 
For any enquiries, please contact helpdesk@k4d.info. 
Suggested citation 
Kundt, T.C. (2017). Private Sector Development and Growth in Developing Countries – The Role of Tax Policy 
and Administration. K4D Emerging Issues Report. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies. 
Copyright 
This report was prepared for the UK Government’s Department for International Development (DFID) and its 
partners in support of pro-poor programmes. It is licensed for non-commercial purposes only. K4D cannot be held 
responsible for errors or any consequences arising from the use of information contained in this report. Any views 
and opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of DFID, K4D or any other contributing organisation. 
© DFID - Crown copyright 2017. 
  
Contents 
1. Overview .................................................................................................................................. 1 
2. Taxation and growth in developing countries ..................................................................... 3 
The relationship between tax ratios, tax structures and growth ............................................... 3 
Tax design considerations and broader governance implications ........................................... 8 
Potential research gaps ............................................................................................................ 9 
3. The role of tax policy in private sector development ......................................................... 9 
Taxation of the informal economy .......................................................................................... 10 
Taxation and foreign direct investments ................................................................................ 10 
The use of tax incentives and special regimes ...................................................................... 13 
The role of tax certainty .......................................................................................................... 15 
Potential research gaps .......................................................................................................... 17 
4. The role of tax administrations ........................................................................................... 17 
Tax compliance costs in developing countries ....................................................................... 18 
Effects of tax administration quality and -performance on growth and productivity .............. 21 
Capacity building in tax administrations: current trends ......................................................... 22 
Potential research gaps .......................................................................................................... 22 
5. Conclusions .......................................................................................................................... 23 
6. References ............................................................................................................................. 24 
7. Appendix ................................................................................................................................ 28 
 1 
1. Overview 
Strengthening domestic revenue mobilisation in partner countries through efficient, effective, fair 
and transparent tax systems has received particular attention from the international development 
agenda in recent years. Vital tax systems will play a crucial role to improve the long-term 
development prospects of low-income and emerging economies, thereby becoming an important 
means of implementation for the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
Against this backdrop, many donor countries have decided to intensify their work to domestic 
revenue mobilisation over the next years. The launch of the Addis Tax Initiative (ATI) at the third 
Financing for Development Conference in Addis Ababa (2015) provided a landmark in this 
regards. Development partners joining the ATI commit to collectively double their support to 
domestic revenue mobilisation and taxation until 20201.  
The support for tax systems is thereby likely to impact developing countries on a broader scale. 
Although taxation is first and foremost about raising revenues for financing public goods and 
services, sound tax policies and effective tax administrations also play an important role for 
achieving broader social, economic and governance objectives, such as promoting investment 
and equity, reducing social and economic ills, or strengthening governmental accountability. Tax 
systems therefore directly impact the development of a competitive private sector and developing 
countries’ prospects for inclusive economic growth through a variety of often interrelated 
channels. 
This rapid review seeks to provide a brief overview on recent contributions to the literature, which 
is complemented by some empirical findings. A particular focus is on contributions from 
international organisations that are active in the field of taxation and development, including the 
Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD), the World Bank Group and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as academic work from peer-review journals. 
Where applicable and useful, the study relates to high-level commitments made by the 
international community, most notably those of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda. Due to the time 
frame and the complexity of the topic, the level of detail is limited. This is also due to some gaps 
in the literature, which might require further research. 
A key finding of the report is that there is no generic relationship between taxation (e.g., as 
expressed by the tax-to-GDP ratio), inclusive development, and the formation of a competitive 
private sector, which is one of the main drivers of economic growth. By contrast, the role of 
taxation for economic development is highly complex and requires a more broad-based analysis. 
The report therefore adopts a holistic perspective by addressing issues that are related to both, 
tax policies and tax administrations, as well as their interrelations. It also goes beyond the direct 
economic implications of taxation on growth and discusses normative questions that are related 
to equity, governance and their impact on growth.  
The main findings can be summarised as follows: 
Structural factors and good governance 
                                                   
1 The UK, one the ATI founding members, is highly active in the field of taxation and development. According to the ATI 
Monitoring Report 2015, the UK is the largest contributor among the ATI development partners and spent USD 47.2 million to 
support tax policy and administrations in developing countries, which comprises more than 20% of ATI development partners’ 
contributions (Addis Tax Initiative, 2017).  
2 
• Low-income countries were able to increase revenue collection (as measured by the tax-
to-GDP-ratio) over the last years, but still mobilise much fewer taxes than higher income 
countries. 
• The tax-to-GDP ratios in low-income countries are, on average, slightly below the 
minimum threshold that is considered necessary for sustainable growth.  
• Tax structures (i.e. the relative importance of different taxes) can have serious impacts 
on growth. Developing countries still tend to rely to some extent on taxes that are 
economically distorting (such as trade taxes) and thus less growth-friendly than others. 
• Good governance and a vital relationship between taxpayers and the state have an 
important role for state-building and economic growth. 
Tax policies 
• Taxation of the informal sector can be an important measure to improve growth and 
productivity, but the effects depend on several factors such as firm-size and policy 
channels. 
• Tax policies aimed to attract domestic and foreign direct investments, such as tax 
incentives and special tax regimes, are frequently used in developing countries. 
However, the empirical literature on their effectiveness is very limited and suggests that 
tax incentives are often not effective in promoting investments. 
• The topic of tax certainty has recently received broad attention on the G20 level and 
might be also important for developing countries. Tax (un)certainty is significantly linked 
to cross-border transactions, trade, investments and compliance. 
Tax administrations 
• Developing countries often face capacity constraints in revenue administrations, which 
can give rise to poor performance. 
• Local firms operating in developing countries face significantly larger tax compliance 
costs than those in high-income and OECD countries. 
• Tax compliance costs and tax administration performance can have a significant impact 
on private sector development, as they negatively affect new market entries as well as 
firm productivity and growth. 
Potential research gaps can be generalised as follows: 
• Lack of empirical literature on developing countries. Many empirical studies on taxation 
and its particular role for growth cover high-income and OECD countries rather than 
developing countries. Although these studies can serve as an input for discussion, they 
do not allow to draw any general conclusions for developing countries. 
• Reliability and comprehensiveness of data. The lack of empirical literature is often driven 
by the absence of appropriate data. Data for developing countries is generally scare and 
often of poor quality. This observation holds for many topics covered by this Helpdesk 
Report. Sometimes data is also non-public, as in the case of the Tax Administration 
Diagnostic Assessment Tool (TADAT). 
• Integrated analysis of taxation and growth. The effects of taxation on growth and 
development are complex and might require additional efforts for an integrated analysis, 
which at the same time takes into account tax design considerations, the impact of 
revenue administrations and the effect of other “soft” factors related to good governance. 
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2. Taxation and growth in developing countries 
This section addresses the question of how taxation affects inclusive growth, and how tax 
systems impact the development perspectives of low-income and emerging economies. This 
general overview shall lay the foundation for the more detailed analysis of the role of tax policies 
and administrations in the following sections.  
The relationship between tax ratios, tax structures and growth 
Tax-to-GDP ratios and development 
The tax-to-GDP ratio (i.e., tax revenues as a percentage of GDP) is a commonly used indicator 
for assessing a countries’ overall revenue collection (Prichard, 2016a). Cross-country 
comparisons have shown that low-income economies tend to rely on much lower tax-to-GDP 
ratios than high-income or OECD countries (Besley & Persson, 2014). Figures 1 and 2 below 
give an impression of the relationship between country income level and tax revenue 
mobilisation. The figures show the average tax-to-GDP ratios for different country income groups 
and OECD countries, covering the period from 2008-2015:  
 
Source: ICTD Government Revenue Dataset (2015).  
Figure 1 shows that tax revenue mobilisation has increased in low-income countries between 
2008 (11.6%) and 2015 (14.5%). The average value of 14.5% is, however, still 10.3 percentage 
points below the average tax-to-GDP ratio in OECD countries (Figure 1). The other country 
groups achieved tax-to-GDP ratios in the order of 17% to 19% of GDP, which is also larger than 
the average of low-income countries (14.5%). The difference between OECD and low-income 
countries becomes even more apparent when social security contributions are included in the 
tax-to-GDP ratio (Figure 2). In this case, the difference rises to more than 20 percentage points.  
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Source: ICTD Government Revenue Dataset (2015).  
Figures 3 and 4 show a similar pattern, but in this case only cover non-resource tax revenues. As 
argued by Prichard (2016a), resource taxes are a much more volatile source of state revenues. 
Given their lack of predictability and robustness, they can pose some serious fiscal stress on 
countries. 
 
Source: ICTD Government Revenue Dataset (2015).  
33.2%
34.8%
19.3% 20.3%
22.6% 22.2%
18.2% 18.7%
11.6%
14.2%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Figure 2: Tax revenues (% of GDP),
including social security contributions 
OECD High Income Higher-Middle Income Lower-Middle Income Low Income
22.9%
23.7%
16.6%
17.1%
17.7% 18.2%
15.5%
15.9%
10.9%
14.1%
10%
15%
20%
25%
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Figure 3: Non-resource tax revenues (% of GDP), excluding social 
security contributions 
OECD High Income Higher-Middle Income Lower-Middle Income Low Income
5 
 
Source: ICTD Government Revenue Dataset (2015).  
A minimum tax-to-GDP ratio for sustainable growth 
Although the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (UN, 2015) sets no specific revenue targets for 
developing countries, it has been frequently argued that there might be a minimum tax-to-GDP 
ratio necessary for sustainable growth. The United Nations, for instance, proposed that a tax-to-
GDP ratio of 20% would be consistent with the Millennium Development Goals (UNDP, 2010). 
Another common threshold, which has long been advocated by international organisations, has 
been set at a value of 15% (Prichard, 2016a). This value is slightly larger than the observed tax-
to-GDP ratio for low-income countries. In spite of the common use of revenue thresholds, there 
appears to be a lack of empirical support for these minimum values, which Prichard (2016a, 
p.52) describes as “somewhat arbitrary”.  
There is, however, some recent empirical work on the topic. In an IMF study, Gaspar et al. 
(2016) estimate a tax-to-GDP ratio of roughly 12.9% as a “tipping point” for economic 
development. Countries exceeding this threshold are supposed to show a sharp and sustainable 
rise in subsequent GDP growth due to a shift in social norms. The results suggest that, after a 
period of ten years, the per-capita income in countries just above the tipping point is 7.5% larger 
than in similar countries below that point. As the authors argue, there is an inherent relationship 
between a state’s capacities to tax, the social norm of paying taxes, and economic development. 
A country that is able to improve its tax capacities above the tipping point can demonstrate its 
effectiveness and legitimacy to the taxpayers. They will regard it as their civic duty to pay taxes 
on a voluntary basis rather than as a result of pure coercion. Growth is finally triggered through 
various channels, including improved public spending, formalisation of firms and individuals, and 
the reduction of market entry barriers such as corruption (Gasper et al., 2016).  
The line of reasoning of Gaspar et al. (2016) emphasises the fact that there is no simple 
relationship between the tax-to-GDP ratio and growth. Instead, governance and other normative 
considerations play an important role when it comes to the question how tax systems (directly 
and indirectly) affect economic growth and private sector development.  
 
32.3%
34.3%
18.3% 19.3%
20.0%
21.0%
16.7% 16.9%
11.0%
14.2%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Figure 4: Non-resource tax revenues (% of GDP),
including social security contributions 
OECD High Income Higher-Middle Income Lower-Middle Income Low Income
6 
The effect of tax structures on growth 
Developing- and higher-income countries do not only differ in their overall level of taxation (as 
expressed by the tax-to-GDP ratio), there are usually also significant differences in the relative 
importance of different tax revenue sources (“tax structure”). Developing countries often focus on 
taxes that are relatively easy to collect, such as taxes on international trade and transactions, as 
well as on consumption taxes (Besley & Persson, 2014; Morrissey et al., 2016). In ATI partner 
countries, for instance, the share of taxes on international trade and transactions accounted to 
15.5% of tax revenues, compared to 0.5% for ATI development partners (Addis Tax Initiative, 
2017). In addition, direct taxes are usually less important than in high-income countries and 
much more focused on corporate income taxes (CIT) than on personal income taxes (PIT) 
(McNabb & LeMay-Boucher, 2014). Figure 5 provides an overview on the relative importance of 
different taxes (as a percentage of non-resource tax revenues) in low-income and other 
countries. The results are in line with the facts presented above. 
Figure 5: Relative importance of different tax types (% of non-resource tax revenues) 
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Source: ICTD Government Revenue Dataset (2015). 
It is a common prediction that some tax structures are less economically distorting and thus more 
growth-friendly than others (McBride, 2012; Prichard, 2016a). The IMF and other international 
institutions have advocated that developing countries should put stronger emphasis on 
consumption taxes instead of trade taxes, and to reduce corporate- and personal income tax 
rates (Prichard, 2016a). In the same vein, the 2008 OECD Report on “Tax and Economic 
Growth” proposed a “ranking” of taxes with respect to their effects on economic growth, with 
taxes on immovable property having the least negative impact on long-term growth, followed by 
consumption taxes, personal income taxes, and corporate income taxes2 (Johansson et al., 
2008).  
This international advice is supported by a series of empirical studies. In a systematic review of 
the empirical literature, McBride (2012) summarises the results of 26 academic studies. Most of 
these studies find a significant negative effect of taxation on growth, particularly when revenues 
are generated via the CIT or the PIT. The results of the studies, however, mostly apply for higher 
income countries rather than for developing countries, which makes it hard to derive any general 
conclusions. Prichard (2016a) relates this lack of evidence for developing countries to the 
generally limited data coverage for these countries. 
In one of the studies using data for developing countries, Acosta-Ormaechea & Yoo (2012) find a 
negative effect of direct taxes on GDP growth rates in high- and middle-income countries, while 
consumption taxes have an opposite effect. For low-income countries, however, Acosta-
Ormaechea & Yoo (2012) do not find any significant results. Using a similar econometric 
approach, McNabb & LeMay-Boucher (2014) study the growth effects of revenue-neutral 
changes in the tax structure. Their results suggest that reducing trade taxes in favour or personal 
income taxation significantly decreases growth in low- and middle-income countries. By contrast, 
moving away from consumption taxes to personal income taxes has a significantly negative 
effect on growth in middle-income and OECD countries, but not for the subsample of low-income 
countries. In another paper, Martínez-Vázquez & Vulovic (2011) study tax structures in the Latin-
American region. They find a negative and significant growth effect for an increase in the ratio of 
direct to indirect taxes.  
                                                   
2 The same ranking of taxes has been more recently proposed by Acosta-Ormaechea & Yoo (2012).  
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Tax design considerations and broader governance implications  
Efficiency vs. equity considerations 
International advice on the appropriate tax composition for developing countries is often driven 
by efficiency considerations, which means that distortionary taxes should be favoured over taxes 
that are less economically distorting. There is however increasing attention on the equity 
implications of tax structures, which are directly linked to the notion of inclusive growth (Brys et 
al., 2016). Inclusive growth hereby means that growth benefits the society as a whole, and that 
development prospects are shared more equally (Brys et al., 2016).  
Based on the concept of inclusive growth, a recent OECD publication by Brys et al. (2016) re-
examines the 2008 OECD report on “Tax and Economic Growth” cited previously. The authors 
make an extensive tax-by-tax assessment based on the ranking that has been proposed by the 
OECD and other international organisations. The idea is to focus on tax policies that either 
reduce the potential trade-off between efficiency and equity, or that improve economic efficiency 
and inclusiveness at the same time. It would be out of the scope of this report to present detailed 
information on equity and efficiency considerations for each single tax.  
As noted in Brys et al. (2016), taxation and inclusive growth in developing countries depends on 
structural factors such as the tax mix and appropriate tax design. It is crucially affected by tax 
capacities and broader topics of good governance, with the latter being often regarded as a main 
driver of economic growth.  
Good governance and the relationship between taxpayers and the state 
Over the last years, donors and international organisations have increasingly stressed the role of 
good governance in taxation. A vital relationship between taxpayers and the state that is based 
on the principles of accountability and mutual trust is regarded as a key precondition for state-
building, democratic participation as well as inclusive and sustainable development (Addis Tax 
Initiative, 2015; Platform for Collaboration on Tax, 2016; Prichard, 2016b).  
This relationship is often described as an informal “fiscal contract” between taxpayers and the 
state (Figure 6). A basic premise of the fiscal contract is that taxpayers hold the state 
accountable for the use of their tax payments (i.e. they expect something in return) (Fjeldstad, 
2014) and that they are more likely to feel ownership for governmental activities when they are 
required to pay taxes (Prichard, 2016b). By promoting good governance and effective 
institutions, the state can signal its accountability and legitimacy, which in turn will give rise to a 
social norm of voluntary tax compliance (Gaspar et al., 2016). 
Regarding growth, the “virtuous circle” (Gaspar et al., 2016, p.9) of strong institutions and good 
governance on the one hand and social norms of compliance on the other hand can support 
growth through several channels. A high degree of voluntary tax compliance enlarges the tax 
base and thus allows to finance further improvements in state capacities. The formalisation of 
markets will increase growth, and greater accountability of a larger number of taxpayers will 
improve governance, decrease corruption and reduce barriers for market entries (Gaspar et al., 
2016). Finally, governments that depend on the payment of taxes will have a strong incentive to 
promote growth, because growth is translated into taxpayers’ prosperity, and prosperity 
ultimately into additional tax payments (Fjeldstad, 2014). 
Figure 6: The fiscal contract and growth 
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Source: Based on Gaspar et al. (2016). 
It is important to note that governance aspects of taxation, despite their wide recognition, have 
received relatively little empirical support so far (Prichard, 2016b). This might be an area for 
future research.  
Potential research gaps 
• There are only some studies that address the question how tax structures affect growth 
in developing countries.  
• There is growing attention on the good governance dimension of taxation and its relation 
to growth and development. At the same time, empirical evidence on the topic is scarce 
and might require further research. 
3. The role of tax policy in private sector development 
The previous section dealt with general issues related to domestic revenue mobilisation and 
taxation in developing countries and their relation to growth, namely the overall level of taxation 
(tax-to-GPD ratio), the growth-effects of different tax structures and some principle tax design 
considerations. This section focuses on some more concrete tax policy options that are 
discussed in the literature. 
Developing countries can, in principle, draw on a broad set of tax policy options to improve 
inclusive growth and to support the formation of a competitive private sector. Decisions are likely 
to be driven by a broad set of factors, including a country’s general state of economic 
development, the socio-economic background, the political system as well as political economy 
factors, the existence of natural resource wealth, etc. It would be out of the scope of this rapid 
review to address all these factors in detail. Instead, this section focuses on policy areas that 
have been commonly addressed by the literature, and how they relate to inclusive growth. These 
include the taxation of the informal economy, the role of taxation for foreign direct investments 
(FDI), particularly through the use of tax incentives, and the topic of tax certainty, which has been 
recently addressed by the G20. These topics are, of course, neither meant to be exhaustive, nor 
State  
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to cover all areas that are included in the taxation and development agenda. Some other areas of 
taxation are also addressed in Section 4, which deals with the role of tax administrations. 
Taxation of the informal economy3  
A large informal sector is found to be a persistent phenomenon in many developing countries 
(Besley & Persson, 2014). Some estimates suggest that the informal sector accounts to 30-40% 
of total economic activities in low-income countries (La Porta & Shleifer, 2014). Firms are usually 
referred to as being “informal” when they choose to remain unregistered and fail to comply with 
the relevant legislations, of which tax laws and regulations are an important aspect Joshi et al., 
2014).  
The taxation of the informal sector can have some important impacts on inclusive growth and 
economic activity. Informal firms are generally regarded as being much less productive than 
formal firms because they are typically smaller, less efficient and often run by entrepreneurs that 
are poorly educated (La Porta & Shleifer, 2014). According to Besley & Persson (2014), it is also 
much more difficult for small informal firms to benefit from economies of scale and from 
opportunities to export, given that they operate outside of the legal system. Finally, as argued by 
Singh (2014), state capacities and strong institutions depend on the formalisation of economic 
activities. The informal sector, by contrast, limits state capacities and ultimately hinders the 
expansion of a productive formal sector.  
In a comprehensive review of the literature, Joshi et al. (2014) find that the effects of taxing the 
informal economy are rather complex and mainly depend on the size of informal firms. The 
authors note that there is a growing body of empirical and experimental studies which stress the 
benefits of entering into the formal economy. These include access to capital markets, new 
market opportunities, less exposure to police and municipal officers, and access to training and 
capacity building. In addition to that, Brys et al. (2016) argue that informal workers might benefit 
from formalisation through the access to social protection, more adequate contracts, higher 
wages, and reduced vulnerability in case of losing their jobs or getting retired. Overall, Joshi et al. 
(2014) conclude that there is growing empirical support for the positive growth effects of informal 
sector taxation. More research is however necessary to study the relationship of taxation and 
firm size and the importance of different channels.  
Taxation and foreign direct investments 
The Addis Ababa Action Agenda (UN, 2015) recognises that foreign direct investments can make 
an important contribution to sustainable development, especially when investments are aligned 
with regional and national sustainable development strategies. It also critically notes that FDI in 
developing countries is often concentrated on a few sectors, and that there are investment gaps 
in key sectors for sustainable development.  
In general, the economic effects of FDI have been intensively studied in the theoretical and 
empirical literature. Although findings are sometimes mixed, there are some general 
observations on how FDI contributes to growth, productivity and competition. In a review of the 
literature, Freckleton et al. (2012) outlines some important growth channels of FDI, which 
                                                   
3 This section only focuses on the growth-related effects of taxing the informal economy. For a comprehensive 
overview of the topic, see Joshi et al. (2014). 
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include: increases in the domestic capital stock; technology spillovers; increased domestic 
competition which leads to greater productivity, as well as impacts on human capital formation 
through training and imitation. Freckleton et al. (2012) also note that the impact of FDI largely 
depends on the absorptive capacities of the host countries. The effects of technology spillovers 
can be, for instance, limited due to a lack of human capital and inadequate infrastructure. 
Taxation is often regarded as an important determinant of foreign direct investments. In a recent 
business survey, the OECD found that the overall tax environment ranks among the top three 
reasons for investments and location decisions (IMF & OECD, 2017). Taxation can thus be an 
important factor for FDI and subsequent growth. Having this in mind, the following sub-section 
first provides an overview on FDI flows to developing countries, and then discusses the role of 
taxation for foreign direct investments in more detail. 
FDI inflows in developing countries 
Figures 7 and 8 summarise information on FDI inflows in developing and transition countries. 
Data is for a ten-year period from 2006-2016 and comes from the UNCTAD World Investment 
Report 2017 (UNCTAD, 2017). 
Figure 7: FDI inflows 2006-2016 in developing and transition countries (billion USD) 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2017).  
Notes: FDI as a percentage of total worldwide inflows in parenthesis. 
In absolute terms, FDI flows to developing countries accounted to USD 646.03 billion in 2016, 
which accounts for 37.0% of worldwide FDI (Figure 7). From 2015 to 2016, flows to developing 
countries have significantly declined by 14%, whereas at the same time, flows to developed 
countries increased by 4.9%. FDI to transition countries remained relatively stable over time and 
accounted to USD 68.02 billion in 2016. Figure 6 also shows that FDI flows to the Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs), which are often regarded as the most vulnerable economies (UN, 
2015), have nearly doubled from 2006-2016 (USD 19.32 billion vs. USD 37.94 billion). However, 
its share of 2.2 % of total worldwide inflows is still comparably low4.  
                                                   
4 This observation is also stressed in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (UN, 2015, p. 23): “We note with concern 
that many least developed countries continue to be largely sidelined by foreign direct investment that could help 
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Figure 8: FDI inflows 2006-2016 by development regions (billion USD) 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2017).  
Notes: FDI as a percentage of total worldwide inflows in parenthesis. FDI inflows to Oceania (not displayed) were 1.41 billion 
USD (0.1%) in 2006 and 1.92 billion USD (0.1) in 2016. 
Figure 8 shows that FDI inflows in developing countries are mostly concentrated on the Asian 
region. In 2016, total inflows to Asia were USD 442.66 billion: 25.3% of worldwide inflows, and 
68.5% of FDI to developing countries. The second largest flows (USD 142.07 billion, 8.1%) are 
recorded for Latin America and the Caribbean. By contrast, FDI inflows accounted to only USD 
59.37 billion in developing Africa (3.4% of worldwide inflows, 9.2% of inflows to developing 
countries), but increased by 36% from 2006 to 2016. 
The role of taxation for FDI 
There is comprehensive empirical evidence on the effect of tax rates on foreign direct 
investments. According to the OECD (2008), studies on cross-border financial flows on average 
suggest that a one-percentage point increase in tax rates leads to a decrease in FDI of 3.7%. 
The results of these studies vary however, with effects ranging from 0% to 5%. In a more recent 
meta-analysis of the literature, Feld & Heckemeyer (2011) use a total of 704 primary estimates to 
calculate the sensitivity of FDI to tax changes. The authors find that foreign direct investments 
decrease by 2.49% in response to a one percentage-point increase in tax rates; this value drops 
to 1.8% when firm-level rather than aggregated data is employed.  
As James (2014) argues, studies on the effect of taxation on FDI mostly focus on investments in 
OECD countries, which is mainly due to the limited data available for developing countries. 
However, studies focusing on developing countries deliver similar results, albeit on a smaller 
scale. These studies find that a ten-percentage increase in corporate tax rates decreases FDI by 
0.45 percentage points of GDP (James, 2013). A similar result is reported by Klemm & Van Paris 
(2012) who estimate values of 0.31 to 0.32 percentage points, depending on the econometric 
technique. 
                                                                                                                                                              
to diversify their economies, despite improvements in their investment climates. We resolve to adopt and 
implement investment promotion regimes for least developed countries”.  
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Studies on FDI and taxation often rely on statutory tax rates (i.e. as defined in the tax laws). As 
argued by the OECD (2015), statutory tax rates might not be sufficient to reflect the whole tax 
environment, which is better captured by effective average or marginal tax rates. Effective tax 
rates combine information on statutory tax rates with information on other tax provisions that 
might affect companies’ effective tax burden (Abbas & Klemm, 2013). They can be particularly 
sensitive to the provision of tax incentives and special regimes (OECD, 2015), which are 
discussed in detail in the next sub-section. 
The use of tax incentives and special regimes 
Prevalence of tax incentives 
Over the last years, the topic of tax incentives has been one of the focus areas of international 
organisations (IMF et al., 2015). Tax incentive policies play an important role for the attraction of 
domestic and foreign direct investments (OECD, 2015) and have been frequently used by 
governments of developed and developing countries around the world. Table 1 gives an 
overview of the prevalence of several types of tax incentives and special regimes in different 
world regions and country groups. The percentages indicate the share of countries in the 
respective samples that rely on tax incentives: 
Table 1: Tax incentives and special regimes in different world regions 
Region  
(number of 
countries) 
Tax 
holiday/Tax 
exemption 
Reduced 
Tax Rate 
Investment 
Allowance/ 
Tax Credit 
R&D Tax 
Incentive 
Super-
deductions 
SEZ/Free 
Zones/EPZ/ 
Freeport 
Discretionary 
process 
East Asia and 
Pacific (12) 
92% 75% 67% 83% 33% 92% 83% 
Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia (16) 
88% 38% 25% 31% 0% 100% 38% 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean (25) 
88% 32% 52% 12% 4% 72% 40% 
Middle East and 
North Africa (15) 
80% 40% 13% 0% 0% 80% 40% 
OECD (33) 21% 36% 64% 76% 21% 67% 33% 
South Asia (7) 100% 43% 71% 29% 71% 71% 43% 
Sub-Saharan  
Africa (45) 
78% 62% 78% 11% 18% 64% 82% 
Source: James (2014). 
Effects, costs and benefits of tax incentives 
According to the OECD (2015), there might be compelling reasons to rely on tax incentives to 
promote new investments, especially for governments of developing countries. For example, it is 
easier to offer tax incentives rather than to correct for structural weaknesses that might affect 
investment decisions, such as skilled workforce and spending on infrastructure. From a political 
economy perspective, tax incentives might also be easier to communicate than public spending 
(e.g. funds or cash subsidies) because tax incentives do not cause any direct expenditure to 
investors. In addition, James (2013) argues that tax incentives can be a less obvious way of 
providing benefits to certain businesses. Governments can also demonstrate their political 
willingness to attract investments. Finally, ministries other than the Ministry of Finance might be 
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more generous in offering tax incentives because they do not face any direct revenue 
consequences (James, 2013).  
The international reception of tax incentives in developing countries has been rather critical. The 
Addis Ababa Action Agenda outlines that “[t]ax incentives can be an appropriate policy tool” (UN, 
2015, p.13), but at the same time invites developing countries to discuss the role of tax 
incentives in order to end harmful tax practices. The Agenda also stresses the commitment to 
address the excessive use of tax incentives for extractive industries (UN, 2015). Some years 
earlier, the IMF report “Revenue Mobilization in Developing Countries” (2011) presented some 
critical arguments on the widespread use of tax incentives in developing countries. According to 
the IMF (2011), tax incentives can only help to attract investments when overall business 
conditions are sufficient, with the latter often found to matter more. Incentives can be hard to 
control and their benefits might be shifted from incentive to non-incentive companies via transfer 
pricing schemes. The willingness to offer tax incentives might also give rise to special pleading 
and corruption. 
In a recent publication, the IMF et al. (2015) provide comprehensive guidance on the effective 
and efficient use of tax incentives in low-income countries5. Effective thereby means that tax 
incentives lead to their intended objective, while efficiency means that the objectives are 
achieved at low social costs. In addition, the provision of tax incentives should adhere to the 
principals of good governance, in particular with respect to the transparency of governmental 
decisions. Transparency thereby encompasses: (a) legal transparency (i.e., tax incentives are 
codified in relevant tax laws), (b) economic transparency (i.e., costs and benefits of tax incentives 
are assessed ex-ante and ex-post, and made public), and (c) administrative transparency (i.e., 
tax incentive criteria are clear, simple, specific and objective) (IMF et al., 2015). 
In summary, for tax incentives to be beneficial, it is crucial that their positive effects (social 
benefits) outweigh their negative effects (social costs) (James, 2013), which are summarised in 
Table 2 below:  
Table 2: Social benefits and costs of tax incentives 
Social benefits Social costs 
+ Higher revenues from 
increased investments 
+ Net impact of investments on 
jobs and wages 
+ Productivity spillovers of 
investments 
− Revenue losses from 
redundant tax incentives and 
abuse 
− Administrative and –
compliance costs 
− Costs due to distorted 
resource allocation 
Sources: James (2013), IMF et al. (2015). 
 
 
                                                   
5 The report is the one of eight base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) Toolkits. 
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Effectiveness of tax incentives 
Despite their widespread use, there is a lack of recent evidence on the effectiveness of tax 
incentives in developing countries (Klemm & Van Paris, 2012). Observations are also often 
based on anecdotal evidence (James, 2013). The few studies available however suggest that tax 
incentives do not always appear to be effective in attracting investments in developing countries.  
Klemm & Van Paris (2012) used a sample of over 40 countries from Latin America, the 
Caribbean and Africa to study, among others, the effectiveness of tax incentives in mobilising (a) 
foreign direct investments, and (b) total private investments. The authors focused on three types 
of tax incentives, namely reduced tax rates, tax holidays (i.e. temporary tax exemptions or 
reductions), and investment allowances. As shown in Table 1, these incentives play an important 
role in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. Results of Klemm & Van Paris (2012) suggest that 
the effectiveness of tax incentives varies by types of incentives and regions. For Latin America 
and the Caribbean, the authors observed that CIT rates have a significantly negative impact on 
FDI. In addition, the length of tax holidays is positively related to FDI. There is however no such 
effect observable for Africa. Investment allowances have no effects on FDI in both regions, and 
none of the tax incentives affect total private investments.  
Similar results are reported by Abbas & Klemm (2013) as the authors find that the tax incentive 
regimes significantly reduce effective average tax rates (EATR). Under the most generous tax 
regimes, EATR in Africa are close to zero. Special tax regimes again do not appear to lead to 
increased investments. The econometric results show that EATR, under the most generous tax 
incentive regimes, are not significantly related to private fixed investments and FDI (Abbas & 
Klemm, 2013).  
Regarding the redundancy of tax incentives, there is some evidence that companies often decide 
to invest in a country even when no incentives had been granted. In general, tax incentives rank 
very low in companies’ decisions to invest, which are much stronger driven by factors such as 
economic and political stability, as well as the costs of raw material (IMF et al., 2015). The same 
results apply when it comes to the role of specific tax aspects for investments. A recent business 
survey carried out by the OECD reveals that companies, on average, do not regard tax 
incentives as an important factor for investments and location decisions as compared to other tax 
factors (IMF & OECD, 2017). Finally, drawing on results from investor surveys, James (2013) 
shows that redundancy ratios (i.e., share of firms that would have invested if incentives had not 
been granted) can be extremely high in developing countries, with top ratios of sometimes more 
than 90%.  
 
The role of tax certainty 
The topic of tax (un)certainty has received particular attention at the G20 summit during the 
Chinese presidency in 2016 and the German presidency in 2017. From a growth perspective, a 
lack of tax certainty can be particularly harmful because it seriously impacts cross-border 
transactions, trade, investments and compliance (IMF & OECD, 2017; Zangari et al., 2017). Two 
recent publications by the IMF & OECD (2017) and the European Commission (Zangari et al., 
2017) extensively study the role, causes, and consequences of tax uncertainty and provide new 
survey evidence on the topic.  
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Causes and consequences of tax uncertainty 
In general, tax certainty is affected by both domestic and international tax policies, as well as 
their implementation through tax administrations. At the domestic level, tax uncertainty mainly 
arises from a lack of precision in the tax laws and frequent legal changes, and from conflicting 
tax provisions and their interpretation over time (Zangari et al., 2017). Implementation issues are 
mostly related to the effectiveness of tax administrations. Even in the presence of well-defined 
and transparent tax laws, tax administration procedures may cause some serious uncertainty 
among taxpayers. Post-filing procedures such as claiming VAT refunds, for example, are often 
found to be less effective in low-income countries (see Section 4). Tax uncertainty can be due to 
discretionary and incoherent interpretation of the tax laws and procedures by the tax authorities, 
as well as a generally weak relationship between taxpayers and tax administrations (IMF & 
OECD, 2017).  
At the international level, tax uncertainty especially impacts cross-border transactions. The 
causes for tax uncertainty on the international level mainly lay at the lack of tax coordination and 
cooperation between countries, and the application of existing tax laws to new business models 
(Zangari et al., 2017). In particular, dispute resolution mechanisms, which aim to resolve open 
tax questions, may take a long time and cause unpredictable extra costs for businesses. This 
kind of uncertainty is not restricted to international transactions, but might also apply at the 
domestic level (IMF & OECD, 2017).  
The impacts of tax uncertainty on investments are, from a theoretical perspective, not 
straightforward and depend on the underlying assumptions of the models. This view is not 
necessarily supported by (scarce) empirical studies, which find an adverse impact of tax 
uncertainty on trade and investment (IMF & OECD, 2017). The results of two recent surveys on 
tax certainty are summarised below. 
Recent survey evidence 
The OECD has recently conducted two comprehensive surveys on the sources of tax uncertainty 
and their implications for investments. The first business survey was carried out in late 2016 
among 724 companies with headquarters in 62 countries and jurisdictions. The second tax 
administration survey was carried out among members of the OECD Forum on Tax 
Administration (FTA), of which 25 (out of 47) answered the survey (IMF & OECD, 2017).  
In summary, the results of the surveys show that tax certainty is a major issue for both tax 
administrations and businesses. For the latter, tax uncertainty causes additional resource 
expenditures (including management time) and leads to less economic or profitable investments. 
Tax uncertainty is also linked to reduced investments and changes in location. Regarding the 
causes of tax uncertainty, results from the tax administration survey and the business survey turn 
out to be nearly identical, but the causes of tax uncertainty, on average, appear to be regarded 
as less severe from the perspective of tax administration. For details, see Appendix. 
The results of the surveys should be treated with caution, because they only apply to G20 and 
OECD countries. The particular challenges in developing countries might be different from those 
of high-income countries, which makes it hard to draw any general conclusions. However, the 
surveys might provide a valuable input for further discussion of tax certainty in developing 
countries (IMF & OECD, 2017). In addition, some of the respondents might indeed have dealt 
with developing countries in cross-border transactions and thus experienced issues of tax 
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uncertainty in these countries, given that more than 50% of the companies in the sample are 
multinationals. 
Potential research gaps 
• Although there is a growing body of literature, it is still difficult to assess the effects of 
taxing the informal economy to support growth and private sector development. As 
outlined in Joshi et al. (2014), future research might be particularly necessary to evaluate 
the magnitude of growth effects, the advantages or disadvantages for informal firms of 
different sizes and the role of specific policies. 
• There is a limited number empirical studies on the effectiveness of tax incentives in 
developing countries. Given the prevalence of tax incentives, it might be necessary to 
study their role for FDI in more detail. 
• The topic of tax certainty has received particular attention at the G20 agenda. Recent 
empirical findings only relate to OECD and G20 countries, and research on the role of tax 
certainty for developing and emerging economies might need to be extended in the 
future. 
4. The role of tax administrations 
As noted earlier, strengthening inclusive growth and a competitive private sector requires strong 
state institutions, of which revenue administrations are a particularly important component. 
Building efficient and effective tax administrations is primarily linked to strengthening domestic 
revenue mobilisation, and there is increasing international recognition that reform efforts should 
aim at promoting broad-based capacity building in developing countries’ revenue administrations 
(Fjeldstad, 2014; Addis Tax Initiative, 2017). It should however be noted that support to tax 
administrations and tax policy design cannot always be treated in isolation, as poorly-designed 
tax polies, for instance, can cause control problems for tax administrations and may give rise to 
corruption among tax officials (Fjeldstad, 2014). Well-designed tax policies, on the other hand, 
might not become effective if the capacities for their appropriate implementation are missing. 
In addition to their revenue-generation role, strong revenue administrations also have some 
important positive impacts on growth and the overall business environment. Poor tax 
administrations can cause serious compliance costs especially for small companies, which can 
affect their overall productivity and growth (Dabla-Norris et al., 2017), and may even 
disincentivise new firms to enter the market (Braunerhjem & Eklund, 2014). Inefficient tax 
administrations may signal a low “value-for-money” (i.e. tax payments vs. services offered in 
return), thereby negatively affecting taxpayers’ willingness to voluntarily comply with the tax laws 
(Brys et al., 2016) and ultimately growth6.  
Finally, Prichard (2016b) argues that capacity building in tax administrations can affect overall 
good governance and state building through three principle channels:  
a) Demonstration effects: Investments in tax administrations can set new standards for 
other parts of public services (e.g. career opportunities); 
                                                   
6 See Section 2 “Good governance and the relationship between taxpayers and the state” regarding “fiscal 
contract”. 
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b) Spillover effects: Modernising revenue administrations needs to go hand-in-hand with 
investments in parallel agencies (e.g. ministry of finance or business registration), and 
c) Information sharing effects: Data gathered by tax administrations can be a valuable input 
to support, among others, informed political decision making.  
The next sections provide an overview on tax compliance costs of firms operating in developing 
countries. These costs can be comparably large in low-income countries and can have a strong 
disincentive effect on economic activities. In particular, there is some recent (though limited) 
empirical evidence that tax administrative costs significantly impact the number of firm entries 
into the market, and the productivity of young and smaller firms.  
Tax compliance costs in developing countries 
Figure 9 presents an overview on selected tax compliance costs indicators for developing 
countries. Data comes from the World Bank Doing Business Database (subsection “ease of 
paying taxes”) for the fiscal year 2015, and is disaggregated by country income groups (World 
Bank, 2016). Figure 9 covers (a) the average number of payments per year, (b) the average time 
to pay (in hours per year), and (c) the post-filing index (from 0-100). The post-filing index has 
been first introduced in the Doing Business Database 2017 (World Bank, 2016) and is related to 
all costs emerging after the filing of taxes, such as claiming VAT or sales tax refunds, and the 
costs of corporate income tax audits7.  
▪ Figure 9: Tax compliance costs in developing countries 
▪ (a) Number of payments (per year) ▪ (b) Time to pay (hours) 
▪  ▪  
▪ (c) Post-filing index (0-100) ▪  
                                                   
7 For details, see: http://www.doingbusiness.org/methodology/paying-taxes. 
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▪  
▪  
Source: World Bank, 2016.  
▪ Notes: Country classification is based on OECD (http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/)  and World Bank Open Data 
(https://data.worldbank.org/). 
Figure 9 shows that particularly firms in the least developed countries face significantly larger 
compliance costs than those in high-income or OECD countries. The average number of tax 
payments in low-income countries is nearly five times larger than in OECD countries (52 vs. 10.8 
payments), and it takes firms close to three times longer to pay taxes (346 vs. 177.8 hours). In 
addition, the post-filing procedures are much less burdensome in OECD countries, where the 
average post-filing index is 83.1 (of 100) as compared to 30.0 (of 100) in the LDCs. Figure X also 
reveals that the cost of paying taxes significantly decrease with country income size. This is in 
line with the general observation that institutional quality increases with per-capita income 
(Gaspar et al., 2016).  
It should be noted that the Doing Business data on the ease of paying taxes covers medium-
sized companies. The costs of paying taxes can be expected to be even larger for small- or 
micro enterprises, given that they represent are comparably larger fixed component for these 
firms. In addition, larger firms might also benefit from specialised tax departments, and are more 
experienced in post-filing procedures than smaller firms (Dabla-Norris et al., 2017). It is also 
worth noting that the World Bank Doing Business Indicators might not only reflect tax 
administration performance, but a “mixture” of compliance costs related to tax administration 
quality on the one hand and compliance costs related to the tax system on the other hand (e.g., 
due to the complexity of tax rules and regulations) (Braunerhjem & Eklund, 2014; Dabla-Norris et 
al., 2017).  
Figure 10 provides some additional information on tax administrative costs. Data is from the 
World Bank Doing Enterprise Survey and includes information on (a) the percentage of firms that 
have to meet with tax officials, (b) the average number of visits (if there are any), and (c) the 
percentage of firms that identify tax administrations as a major obstacle for doing business. Data 
is again disaggregated by country-income groups: 
 
 
 
 
30.0
49.9
61.1
65.0
83.1
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
LICs LMICs UMICs Other High
Income
OECD
20 
Figure 10: Meetings with tax officials / tax administration as a major obstacle 
▪ (a) Firms visited or required to meet 
with tax officials (% of firms) 
▪ (b) Visits or required meetings with tax 
officials (average number) 
▪  ▪  
▪ (c) Firms identifying tax administration as a 
major constrain (% of firms) 
▪  
▪  
▪  
▪ Source: Data is from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/data).  
▪ Notes: Country classification is based on OECD (http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/) and World Bank Open Data 
(https://data.worldbank.org/). 
The findings presented in Figure 10 are in line with those above. In low-income countries it is 
much more common for firms to meet with tax officials (70.7% of firms, compared to 41.1% in 
OECD countries, and 39.6% in other high-income countries). Firms that have to meet with tax 
officials do this on average three times per year. In high-income and OECD countries, the 
average value is only 1.8 and 1.9. The potential compliance costs due to meetings with tax 
officials again decrease with country income, and apply to a smaller share of firms. Finally, a 
significantly larger percentage of firms (26.1%) think that tax administrations are a major obstacle 
for their business compared to firms in OECD countries (14%).  
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Effects of tax administration quality and -performance on growth 
and productivity  
As noted above, poor tax administration performance is likely to have a negative impact on 
productivity and growth, as it causes significant compliance costs especially for small- and 
medium enterprises. It may also signal taxpayers that the state is ineffective in providing state 
capacities in return for tax payments, which might impact taxpayers’ willingness to voluntary 
comply. The literature research for this rapid review only found a limited number of recent studies 
that focus on developing countries. 
In 2012, the International Tax Compact (ITC) presented a study on tax-related indicators in the 
Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) Framework (ITC, 2010). There are four 
distinct indicators in the framework that relate to taxation, namely PI-3: Aggregate revenue out-
turn compared to original approved budget; PI-13: Transparency of taxpayer obligations and 
liabilities; PI-14: Effectiveness of measures for taxpayer registration and tax assessment; and PI-
15: Effectiveness of collection of tax payments. While the first indicator focuses on revenue 
forecasting, the latter three are more closely linked to tax administration performance. The study 
concludes that there is no relationship between annual GDP growth-rates and the PEFA results 
of the developing and emerging countries in the sample (Figure 11). 
Figure 11: Tax-related PEFA indicators and GDP-growth 
 
Source: International Tax Compact (2012) 
Braunerhjem & Eklund (2014) studied the effect of tax administrative burden on new market 
entries. Their data comes from the World Bank Doing Business Database (see above) and the 
World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Snapshots. As the authors point out, the relationship 
between market entries and tax administrative costs has been hardly addressed by the literature 
so far. They argue that new market entries contribute to welfare and economic growth by 
promoting innovation and productivity, and by strengthening competition between firms. In their 
study, Braunerhjem & Eklund (2014) show that a ten-percent decrease in the tax administrative 
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burden (as measured by the number of tax payments and the time to pay taxes) leads to a three-
percent increase in annual market entries, regardless of corporate income tax rates. 
In a recent IMF study, Dabla-Norris et al. (2017) use data from the Tax Administration Diagnostic 
Assessment Tool (TADAT) to assess the impact of tax administration quality on the productivity 
of small and young firms in developing- and emerging economies. The authors argue that 
TADAT data can be particularly useful to study tax administration quality because TADAT 
assessments capture all core functions of a tax administration. The use of TADAT data also 
allows for separating the impacts of tax administration performance on firm productivity from the 
impacts of the tax system in general. Dabla-Norris et al. (2017) use 33 TADAT measurement 
dimensions to compile a novel Tax Administration Quality Index (TAQI). Their results suggest 
that a higher TAQI score (which is associated with a lower tax compliance costs) significantly 
increases the productivity of small and young firms. In addition, the authors show that the 
productivity gap between smaller and larger firms is much smaller in countries with comparably 
higher TAQI scores. 
Capacity building in tax administrations: current trends 
International organisations and donors have long recognised that developing countries’ revenue 
administrations frequently suffer from significant capacity constraints (IMF, 2011; Fjeldstad, 
2014), which may have serious implications for revenue collection, as well as growth and private 
sector development as described above. In addition, poor institutions that deliver a low “value-
for-money” are likely to have a negative impact on voluntary tax compliance (Brys et al, 2016). 
Building effective tax administrations is thus one of the priorities of international support to low-
income countries (Addis Tax Initiative, 2015 & 2017; Fjeldstad, 2014).  
Efforts of improve the effectiveness of tax administrations and to lower compliance costs 
especially for small enterprises can encompass a broad range of measures, including improved 
taxpayer information, less demanding filing- and post-filing procedures, easier payment of taxes, 
as well as accountability and transparency of the tax administrations (Dabla-Norris et al., 2017). 
As noted by Fjeldstad (2014), current advice from international organisations is thereby primarily 
focused on improved taxpayer services (“customer orientation”), the use of e-systems and 
human capacity building in specialised audit areas and issues of international taxation.  
It is out of the scope of this report to draw general conclusions on the effectiveness of support in 
the above areas, among others because the direct effects of capacity building are hard to assess 
and existing evidence is fragmented and/or anecdotal. 
Potential research gaps 
• There is hardly any comprehensive and detailed country-level data for tax administration 
performance available. The TADAT Performance Assessment Reports, which provide 
highly detailed and evidence-based data on tax administration quality, are non-public for 
most of the countries assessed. Only 7 out of 40 countries decided to make assessment 
results public (status as of August 30, 2017. See: www.tadat.org). During this literature 
review, only one study could be identified that relied on TADAT data to analyse the 
effects of tax administration quality on growth and productivity (Dabla-Norris et al., 2017). 
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5. Conclusions 
The mobilisation of domestic revenues, particularly through efficient, effective, transparent and 
fair taxation, plays a pivotal role to improve the development prospects of low-income and 
emerging economies, and is a central means of implementation for the UN Sustainable 
Development Goals. Advice of international organisations and donors is often focused on the 
direct revenue implications of taxation, and increasingly on the question how good governance 
can improve the relationship between taxpayers and the state, which is regarded as central for 
state-building and growth. 
In addition to their revenue-generating role, sound tax policies and effective tax administrations 
are also key for strengthening a competitive private sector and supporting inclusive economic 
growth. This rapid review focused on this particular impact of tax administrations and –policies, 
and the results of this desk research can be summarised as follows: 
• Structural factors and good governance. Developing and emerging countries typically 
raise fewer taxes than high-income and OECD countries, with average tax-to-GDP ratios 
(i.e. tax revenues as percentage of GDP) in the order of 14%. For developing countries, it 
is critical to reach a certain tax-to-GDP ratio of approximately 13%-15% to ensure 
sustainable subsequent growth path. A pro-growth tax mix should focus on less-distortive 
taxes such as consumption taxes or property taxes, and at the same time consider 
equality implications of specific tax designs. Good governance in taxation requires a vital 
relationship between taxpayers and the state (“fiscal contract”) and strong institutions. 
This can give rise to a “virtuous circle” of accountability, mutual trust and growth, built 
around a social norm of paying taxes. 
• Tax policies. Developing countries have various tax policy options to foster sustainable 
growth and to strengthen a competitive private sector. There is emerging evidence that 
the taxation of the informal sector can have positive impacts on growth through various 
channels. Foreign direct investments (FDI) remain on a comparably low level particular in 
Africa and the Least Developed Countries. FDI are affected by statutory corporate tax 
rates, but effective tax rates can be even more important. Tax incentives, which are 
widespread in developing countries, have proven to be somehow ineffective in the 
attraction of domestic private- and foreign direct investments, and their benefits crucially 
depend on an appropriate design that takes into account principles of good governance. 
Tax certainty is a central topic at the G20 agenda and relates to domestic and 
international tax policies, as well as their implementation trough tax administrations. 
While current evidence on tax certainly merely relates to G20 and OECD countries, tax 
certainty is also an important topic for developing and emerging countries, and some of 
the lessons from recent business and tax administration survey might feed into the 
discussion how to improve tax certainty in developing countries. 
• Tax administrations. Tax administrations in developing countries frequently suffer from 
capacity constraints, and their performance is often regarded to be poor. A lack of quality 
may give rise to serious tax compliance costs for taxpayers, which turn out to be 
significantly larger than in high-income and OECD countries. These costs can be, 
however, related to both a lack of tax administration performance and general 
weaknesses of the tax system (e.g. complex tax laws). Although there is limited empirical 
evidence on the effects of tax administration performance on growth for developing 
countries, some studies find that tax administration performance can affect the market 
entry rates of new firms and the productivity of small and young firms. International 
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advice on capacity building in tax administrations is currently focused on some particular 
topics, including taxpayer services, e-systems and human capacity building in specific 
areas (including international taxation). The effectiveness of these measures is, however, 
hard to assess and out of the scope of this rapid desk research. 
A recurring theme of the report was the lack of (empirical) evidence for developing and emerging 
countries, which applies to many topics discussed in the report, and which is often related to poor 
data quality and availability for these countries. While evidence for developed countries might be 
to some extent generalizable, informed and robust support to developing countries will crucially 
depend on more accurate data for these countries. An emerging number of developing countries, 
for instance, have undertaken TADAT assessments, which can provide a valuable input for tax 
reforms. In summary, the lack of evidence for developing countries is an important research gap 
identified in this report.  
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7. Appendix:  
Survey results on tax certainty 
The results of the business surveys can be summarised as follows: 
• The most important factor for investments and location decisions is corruption (mean 
rating: 3.9 out of 5)8 followed by political certainty (3.8) and the overall tax environment 
(3.8) 
• Among the specific tax factors, uncertainty about the effective tax rate on profit is ranked 
highest (3.9), followed by the anticipated effective tax rate on profit (3.7) and uncertainty 
about input tax credits, refunds, place of supply issues for VAT/GST purposes and/or 
uncertainty about the tax burden of other consumption taxes (e. g. excises, sales taxes, 
custom duties) (3.6)9.  
• Regarding the impact of tax uncertainty on business operations, the option “Additional 
resource expenditures (including management time) incurred to manage tax uncertainty” 
was most frequently chosen by respondents (326 selections), followed by “Led to less 
economical/profitable investments” (310) and “Reduced or changed location of 
investment” (289). Only a small number of firms appear to benefit from tax uncertainty: 
“The firm took advantage of tax uncertainty to reduce firm's tax liability in a country” was 
chosen 59 times and “Tax uncertainty provided some positive opportunities” only 19 
times. 
• Finally, respondents provided information on the sources of tax uncertainty with respect 
to tax policy design and legislation, tax administration, dispute resolution, and specific 
international dimensions. Table below 3 displays the top three answers: 
Table 3: Causes of tax uncertainty from business perspective 
(top three causes) 
Tax policy design and legislation Tax administration 
• Complexity in the tax legislation (e.g. 
different definition of permanent 
establishment for VAT/GST and CIT 
purposes) (3.30) 
• Unclear, poorly drafted tax legislation 
(3.25) 
• Frequent changes in the statutory tax 
system (rates, deductions, credits, 
new taxes, etc.), regulations and 
guidance (3.18) 
• Considerable bureaucracy to comply 
with tax legislation, including 
documentation requirements (3.54) 
• Unpredictable or inconsistent treatment 
by the tax authority (3.53) 
• Inability to achieve early certainty pro-
actively through rulings or other similar 
mechanisms (e.g. Advance Pricing 
Arrangement) (3.20) 
Dispute resolution International dimensions 
• Lengthy decision making of the courts, 
tribunals or other relevant bodies 
(3.34) 
• Inconsistencies or conflicts between 
tax authorities on their interpretations 
of international tax standards (e.g. on 
                                                   
8 Respondents were asked to provide a rating from 1 (not important at all) to 5 (extremely important) for each 
factor. 
9 Tax incentives, as mentioned earlier, rank among the bottom three, with an average rating of 3.2. 
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• Unpredictable and inconsistent 
treatment by the courts (3.26) 
• Lack of published decisions clarifying 
interpretation (2.99) 
transfer pricing or VAT/GST ) (3.38) 
• Tax legislation not in line with the 
evolution of new business models 
(3.26) 
• Lack of expertise in tax administration 
on aspects of international taxation 
(3.22) 
Source: IMF & OECD (2017). 
The tax administration survey came to the following results: 
• Tax administrations see tax uncertainty as a major issue for their country, with an 
average rating of 4.2 (1 = low priority, 5 = high priority). In addition, tax administrations 
think that tax uncertainty is a also significant problem for taxpayers (4.6) 
• Tax administrations also provided information on the sources of tax uncertainty, again 
with respect to tax policy design and legislation, tax administration, dispute resolution, 
and specific international dimensions. The results of tax administrations are nearly 
identical to those of the business survey, but the causes of tax uncertainty, on average, 
appear to be regarded as less severe (Table 4): 
Table 4: Causes of tax uncertainty from tax administration 
perspective (top three causes) 
Tax policy design and legislation Tax administration 
• Complexity in the tax legislation (e.g. 
different definition of permanent 
establishment for VAT/GST and CIT 
purposes) (3.12) 
• Unclear, poorly drafted tax legislation 
(2.80) 
• Frequent changes in the statutory tax 
system (rates, deductions, credits, 
new taxes, etc..), regulations and 
guidance (2.76) 
• Considerable bureaucracy to comply 
with tax legislation, including 
documentation requirements (2.48) 
• Inability to achieve early certainty pro-
actively through rulings or other similar 
mechanisms (e.g. Advance Pricing 
Arrangement) (2.20) 
• Corruption in the tax system (1.96) 
Dispute resolution International dimensions 
• Lengthy decision making of the courts 
tribunals or other relevant bodies 
(3.00) 
• Unpredictable and inconsistent 
treatment by the courts (2.48) 
• Lack of published decisions clarifying 
interpretation (2.32) 
• Inconsistencies or conflicts between 
tax authorities on their interpretations 
of international tax standards (e.g. on 
transfer pricing or VAT/GST) (2.64) 
• Lack of understanding of international 
business (2.44) 
• Tax legislation not in line with the 
evolution of new business models 
(2.40) 
Source: IMF & OECD (2017). 
 
